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MULTINATIONAL FIRMS:
EASY COME, EASY GO?
21. INTRODUCTION
When comparisons are made about different countries' relative abilities to attract inward
investment from multinational enterprises (MNEs), it is often argued that firms prefer to
establish operations in countries with less regulated markets (particularly the labour market).
The premise is that the firm will have more freedom to adjust to prevailing economic
conditions in such locations.  There is the implicit acknowledgement that the firm may not
choose to maintain a particular level of production indefinitely and takes into account the
costs of downsizing or closing its branch plant entirely.
It is frequently claimed that the relative success of the United Kingdom in attracting
overseas investment, relative to their continental partners in the EU, can partly be explained
by its less regulated labour market that permits the firm to adjust its employment level more
easily than in could were its operations based in another of the large European nations.  Thus
firms concern themselves not only with entry costs and relative productivity levels but also
with the potential costs of downsizing and closure.  Britain, by making it easier to layoff
workers, becomes more attractive to MNE which will find it easier to both “come” and “go”
from a location in the UK.
However, these conjectures have seldom received much attention in formal analysis.
Instead, most of the literature on attracting investment from foreign MNEs has focused on
lowering the firm's costs of establishment or its production costs2, largely ignoring the ease
with which the MNE might close down their production facilities.  This paper re-examines
the MNE's investment decision with an explicit consideration of the likelihood of future
closure of the production facilities.  We compare the relative merits of locations when the
firm expects its branch plant to be around for a long time and when the MNE is in an industry
                                                
2 For a (partial) review of this literature, see Haaland and Wooton (1999).  Braunerhjelm et al (2000) include an
overview of empirical findings on the location decisions of firms.  The literature is closely related to studies of
tax competition for foreign investments; see e.g. Haufler and Wooton (1999) and Kind, Midelfart Kanrvik and
Schjederup (2000).  Devereux and Griffith (1998) present empirical findings on the importance of taxes for the
3characterized by a great deal of uncertainty.  In this setting we consider the policy
instruments that a government might use to make its country a more attractive location for
MNE investment.  We focus on two that seem of particular relevance.
The first is related to the labour market flexibility of a host country.  A firm, in
making its location decision in an uncertain economic climate, will look not only at the costs
of training and employing its workers but also at the financial implications of firing them,
should economic conditions worsen.  Thus the rules on severance pay must be taken into
account3.  Thus a low-wage location might have low production costs, but this benefit may be
offset by the requirement that former employees receive high redundancy settlements.
Clearly the likelihood of failure is a crucial consideration.
The second element is a development subsidy offered to the firm to offset some of the
fixed costs that it faces in initially establishing the branch plant.  These frequently take the
form of provision of land at subsidized prices, the offer of already built premises, assistance
with the training costs of personnel, or cost-sharing in building new facilities.  What seems to
be important to us is not just the size of the subsidy but the conditions attached to it4.  Clearly
a firm receiving financial assistance and then choosing not to invest would be expected to
return the funds.  But what of a firm that closes down shortly after starting production?  How
might being required to repay some of the subsidy affect its perception of the attractiveness
of the investment location?
We suggest a simple model structure to analyse these issues in the next section.  In
section 3 we examine the firm’s entry and production decisions, while in section 4 we discuss
the policies available to the potential host country to attract the MNE’s investment.  We then
                                                                                                                                                       
location of American firms in Europe.
3 Bentolila and Bertola (1990) study the importance of firing costs for labour demand and the employment
situation in Europe.
4 Mudambi (1999) discusses various types of investment support and analyses the choice of support scheme in a
strategic context.
4consider, in section 5, how industry-specific uncertainty will affect the investment decision
and may make some production locations more attractive than others.  The focus of this paper
is on the attractiveness to the MNE of a particular location, in terms of the mixture of
investment incentives and labour-market policies that the host country offers.  We do not
look at issues of policy competition between the governments of rival locations.  These are at
the heart of the companion paper [Haaland and Wooton (2000].
Before going further, it is perhaps worthwhile addressing what makes the firm in
question a multinational enterprise.  The policy experiments that we conduct are to attract
inward investment from a foreign firm that is prepared to invest in the most attractive
location.  The host government brings benefit to its citizens through the increased
employment opportunities, less any subsidies that are paid to the foreign firm.  Thus, unlike
its dealings with a domestic firm, the government is not concerned with the wellbeing
(profits) of the MNE.  The MNE, for its part, considers the relative merits of locating in
different countries and chooses that which maximizes its objectives5.
2. THE MODEL
We focus on an integrated economic region comprising several countries and that there are no
barriers to trade (tariffs or transport costs) between these countries.  A multinational firm
makes its decision as to the location of production.  We assume that there are several
countries in the region that are potential hosts for the MNE’s investment.  Suppose that the
successful location is country i.6 Wherever it produces, the firm will face the same demand
schedule for its good.  The inverse demand curve is:
p a bx= − (1)
                                                
5 Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2000) show that firms with an option to relocating internationally (i.e. MNEs)
behave differently from firms that do not have this option when it comes downsizing of the production.
5where x is the output level of the branch plant of the MNE and p is the price.
Production is characterized by increasing returns to scale.  Consequently, the firm will
choose to locate its production facilities in a single plant, from which it will serve the entire
region.  While the technology is the same irrespective of where production takes place, costs
will depend on the location chosen by the firm.  In each period of production, the firm must
pay a fixed cost F  and constant marginal cost, such that total costs are:
c F w xβ= + (2)
where β  is the unit labour requirement and w  is the wage rate.  Total employment by the
firm amounts to:
L xβ= (3)
The firm faces initial costs of establishment and these may differ from country to
country.  In choosing one country over another, the firm foregoes the benefits that it would
have enjoyed in the alternative location.  Thus, it will choose to establish production facilities
in country i only if the benefits of doing so exceed those it would achieve in the next-best
location.  National governments may provide financial assistance to attract the firm to invest
in the form of a subsidy.  The nature of this subsidy is discussed at length later in the paper.
The firm faces an uncertain business climate.  The demand for its product can change
as a result of the introduction of new products.  In addition, as technological advances are
made, the firm's existing plant may become obsolete.  In which case, it will face, once again,
the choice of where to locate its (new, more advanced) production facilities.  We model the
uncertainty in an elementary fashion, assuming that a catastrophic shock may arise in a
period with probability ρ .  Such a shock is industry-specific, due to changes in demand or
                                                                                                                                                       
6 As this is the only country under discussion, we can suppress the country-specific subscripts.  We cannot do
6technology, and consequently is independent of the location of the production facilities7.  The
impact of such a shock is to force the firm to close down its production at its existing plant.
The expected lifespan (planning horizon) of the plant is ( )1 /H ρ ρ= − .
Should the firm be obliged to close down its factory, it will encounter some additional
costs.  We examine two principal, country-specific costs of closure.  Firstly, the firm will
have to pay government-mandated severance pay to each of its employees.8  Secondly, there
may be conditions on the subsidy from the government such that, should it close the plant
down, the firm will be required to make some repayment to the national government.
3. THE FIRM’S DECISION
Consider initially what would happen were the firm to focus only on its current productive
activities, ignoring the possibility of future shutdown.  Then it would maximize current
profits.  Profits in each period are:
px cπ = − (4)
Substituting (1) and (2) into (4), differentiating and solving yields the equilibrium quantity,
employment, and profits for the myopic firm:
( )
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(5)
                                                                                                                                                       
this in our analysis of policy competition between potential host countries, in Haaland and Wooton (2000).
7  This is contrary to models of political risk or risk of expropriation, where the risk by assumption is country-
specific [see e.g. Schnitzer (1999)].
8 We do not model how the severance pay is determined by the national government.  We assume that it is
established through some exogenous political process.
7Suppose that, instead of its concern with current profits, the firm is now assumed to
take into account the possibility that its market might collapse at some point, requiring a
closing down of the manufacturing facilities.  The risk of closure affects the firm in two
ways.  Firstly, the riskier the project, the less likely the firm will be to set up production
facilities in the first place.  Secondly, given the decision to establish a branch plant, the
degree of risk will influence the level of production.  Consider this latter element initially.
3.1 Activity level
We assume that the firm discounts the future at rate 1δ ≤ , while the probability that the
market remains strong in any period is ( )1 ρ− .  Thus the expected present value of the future
stream of profits is:
( )
( )
1
1 1
ρ π
Π
δ ρ
−
=
− −
(6)
But there is also the probability that the firm will fail at some point in the future.
When that happens, the firm will face exit costs including layoff costs.  Let r be the severance
pay that the firm is required to give to each laid-off worker when the plant is closed.  As the
redundancy payments are proportional to the number of workers that the firm employs, firms
will take them into account in choosing its activity level.  Clearly, if the firm fails in the first
period before having employed any workers, then it will not have to make redundancy
payments.  Taking this into account, the expected present value of these payments is:
( )
( )
1
1 1
rLδρ ρ
Λ
δ ρ
−
=
− −
(7)
8In deciding upon the optimal level of production (and employment) the firm will maximize
the expected present value of its net operating profits, that is, the expected present value of
profits less the expected present value of the costs of closure:
Ω Π Λ= − (8)
Substituting (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7) into (8) yields the equilibrium quantity,
employment, and profits for the prescient firm:
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The net present value in equilibrium is:
( )
( ) ( ){ }21 44 1 1 a w r bFb ρΩ β δρδ ρ−= − + −  − −   (10)
When we compare the activity levels under foresight with those of myopia, we find from (5)
and (9), that:
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Thus output, profits, and employment will all be lower when the firm takes into account the
redundancy payments that will eventually have to be paid.
93.2 The entry decision
In choosing whether or not to establish its production facilities in a country, the firm
considers both the expected present value of its net operating profits and any extra costs of
establishment and closure.  In particular, the firm may be required to repay some of its
subsidy, if it shuts down its operations early in the lifetime of the plant.9
The government of the host country can make it a condition of the subsidy, S, that it
be repayable, in full or in part, should the firm cease operations in the country.  We model
this in a simple fashion.  If the market collapses prior to any production activity then S must
be returned to the host government in full.  In each subsequent year, the repayment is
discounted by σ .  If 0σ = , there is no required repayment and S is simply a grant.  If 1σ < ,
then the nominal value of S is declining and becomes increasingly a subsidy.  For values of
1σ ≥ , S has become a loan which, when 1σ =  is interest-free.  Let Σ  be the expected net
benefit to the firm of the subsidy; the value of the initial transfer less the expected present
value of the repayment on closure:
( )( )
( )
1 1
1 1
Sρ δσ
Σ
δ ρ σ
− −
=
− −
(12)
The overall return R to the MNE of establishing its branch plant is the sum of the
expected present value of its operating profits, Ω , and the net benefit of the subsidy, Σ .
Writing out the expression in full, from (10) and (12), we find:
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
2
4 1
1
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(13)
                                                
9 The firm will likely face other costs of shutting down production but, for simplicity, these are ignored.
10
This should be compared to the combined costs of setting up in the host country and the
opportunity cost of not investing in the best alternative location.10
4. THE POLICIES OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT
In order to attract the MNE, the putative host can offer inducements to the firm.  At the same
time, domestic legislation will influence the investment decision.  We shall look at two issues
independently, starting initially with layoff policy and then considering the nature of
subsidies offered to the incoming firm.
4.1 Severance agreements
In the model that we described in the previous section of this paper, firms will choose a
particular level of employment of workers whenever they are in production.  Should there be
a downturn in the market, the firm will then cease all production activities at the branch plant,
and will fire all of the workforce.  The firm will be bound to giving their former workers
compensation at a level established by the host government.  We now consider how the
government might use the level of redundancy payment as a policy instrument.
Differentiating (13), yields:
( ) ( )
( )
1
0
2 1 1
a w rR
r b
βδρ ρ β δρ
δ ρ
− − + ∂  
= − <
∂ − −  
Higher redundancy payments both make an investment less appealing and reduce the activity
level of any branch plant that is established.  This is because the firm, in its employment
decision, takes into account the future layoff costs for its workforce.  We see this by
differentiating the output and employment expressions in (9):
                                                
10 In our analysis of policy competition between locations, in Haaland and Wooton (2000), these cost
differences will take on a high degree of importance.
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We illustrate the relationship between various levels of r and the viability of the
investment in Figure 1.11  Each line corresponds to a different ρ , the probability of failure of
the firm in each period.  The higher the probability, the shorter the expected lifespan of the
branch plant, and consequently the lower the expect return to the investment.  We therefore
have a trade-off between the protection of workers in the future and both the likelihood of
attracting the MNE investment and the scale of employment.  A more confident future (low
ρ ) reduces the threat of having to make redundancy payments, making any investment more
rewarding (in expected value) and on a larger scale.
4.2 Investment subsidies
An inspection of (13) makes it clear that the level of S and the repayment conditions on it
have no effect on the activity level of a firm should it decide to establish a branch plant.
Their impact is purely on the decision of the MNE whether or not to invest in the host
country.  We therefore focus on the role that the level of the subsidy and the repayment
conditions attached to it play in that decision.  Differentiating (13) with respect to S shows
that, ceteris paribus and unsurprisingly, a larger subsidy makes the investment more
attractive to the MNE:
( )( )
( )
1 1
0
1 1
R
S
ρ δσ
δσ ρ
− −∂
= >
∂ − −
                                                
11 In these numerical simulations we have (unless otherwise noted) adopted the following parameter values:
a = 10, b = 1⋅25, F = 15, S = 0, w = 1, δ = 0⋅9, σ = 0⋅8 and ρ = 0⋅22.
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The value of subsidy to the MNE, and its cost to the host government, is Σ , given by
(12).  Differentiating Σ  with respect to its arguments yields a negative relationship for each:
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
2
1
0
1 1
1
0
1 1
S
S
δρ ρΣ Σ
δ σ δσ ρ
δσΣ
ρ δσ ρ
−∂ ∂
= = − <
∂ ∂
− −  
−∂
= − <
∂
− −  
The discount rate δ  and the repayment condition σ  enter (12) as a product.  When 0σ = ,
the subsidy is a grant requiring no repayment.  For values of 0σ > , the firm must make some
repayment on closure and the sum to be repaid increases with σ .  When the firm totally
discounts the future repayments (that is, 0δ = ), the expected value of the subsidy is always
( )1 Sρ− , the monetary value of the subsidy discounted by the probability of collapse of the
market prior to any production having taken place (necessitating the return of the subsidy).
The larger is δ, the more important is the future to the firm, making the eventual repayment
of the subsidy more burdensome.  When 1/σ δ= , the government subsidy is of no advantage
to the firm, as it will eventually have to repay principal and interest exactly equal to the
benefit from the original monetary award.
We turn now to the benefits to the firm of the subsidy for different rates of industry
risk.  When 0ρ = , the production facilities remain open indefinitely and, as there is no
expected future repayment, the firm gets the full benefit of the subsidy under any terms where
1/σ δ< .  If, however, immediate failure is guaranteed ( 1ρ = ), even the most favourable
repayment terms cannot make the subsidy worthwhile.  Between these extremes, we see that
more favourable subsidy terms  and lower risk make the investment more attractive.
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4.3 Benefits of investment to the host country
In this partial-equilibrium framework, the advantages to the host country of persuading the
firm to build its branch plant would equal the present value of the wage bill of workers
employed by the MNE, less the present value of the subsidy paid out by the host government.
We assume that the government discounts the future at the same rate as the MNE (δ ).  The
cost of the subsidy (in terms of its expected present value) is therefore identical to its benefit
to the firm Σ .
The present value of the wage bill aggregates the benefits to a worker of employment
over the period of operation of the firm, plus the redundancy payments made when the branch
plant closes down.  This is multiplied by the employment level of the firm in (9).  Let Γ  be
the present value of employment by the MNE, where:
( )( ) ( )
( )
1
2 1 1
w r a w r
b
β ρ δρ β δρ
Γ
δ ρ
− + − +  
=
− −  
(14)
The benefit to the host country of the MNE’s investment is B Γ Σ≡ − , the difference
between equations (14) and (12):
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
1
1
1 12 1 1
w r a w r S
B
b
β δρ β δρ δσρ
δσ ρδ ρ
 + − + 
−  
= − − 
− −− −    
(15)
4.4 The gains from investment
Figure 2 illustrates representative iso-benefit loci for the MNE and the host country when
faced with combinations of redundancy payments and subsidy levels.  We arbitrarily select
R = 10 as the minimal return to the MNE that leaves it indifferent to establishing the branch
plant in country i, rather than in the next-best location.12  Similarly we choose B = 0 which, in
                                                
12 We could have chosen any value of R, to reflect the required return to persuade the MNE to invest in this
14
our partial equilibrium setting, is the level of benefit to the host country that just makes the
investment worthwhile.
Combinations of government policy with higher subsidy and lower severance
payments will make the investment opportunity more attractive to the firm and less appealing
to the host country.  Thus both loci are positively sloped.  However, the B = 0 locus is flatter
than the R = 0 locus at all relevant values of r.  Thus the country gains more from the entry of
the MNE when the subsidy is lower and redundancy payments higher.
A standard optimization exercise (maximizing the benefit to the host country for a
fixed level of benefit to the MNE) yields a first-order condition that
/r w δρ= − (16)
If the government were to implement such a redundancy policy, it would be offering the firm
a payment at closure that fully offsets the costs of employing the workers over the lifetime of
the branch plant.  This means that the firm will treat the marginal costs of production as zero
and will, consequently, choose the highest level of production and employment.  This can be
seen at point A in Figure 3, where 3B ≈  is tangent to R = 10 at this level of (negative)
redundancy payment (r = -5).  The MNE would be prepared to receive a negative subsidy
6S ≈ − , that is, pay a tax to set up production facilities.13
Paying the firm when redundancies occur, rather than the firm compensating the fired
workers, is not likely to be a politically achievable option, despite the inherent efficiency of
the outcome.  Instead, the severance payments will be non-negative and the host government
will have to accept lower overall benefits from the MNE investment in order to make the firm
                                                                                                                                                       
country.  In this paper we have not discussed the initial costs of establishing the branch plant nor the alternative
investment locations available to the MNE.  The firm will only choose to locate in a particular country in the
region if the benefits of doing so exceed those it would receive in the next best location.  These issues are
discussed in Haaland and Wooton (2000).
13 This optimal for the host country because we have assumed that workers not given jobs by the MNE would
otherwise be unemployed and hence their opportunity cost is zero.
15
still willing to enter.  We calculate that 2 4B ≈ ⋅  intersects R = 10 at point B where r = 0 and
14S ≈ .  In the absence of the employment subsidy (negative redundancy payments), the
firm’s willingness to enter is reduced and a positive, rather than negative, subsidy is required.
In addition, as the severance payments are further away from the optimal level, the benefit to
the host country of the investment has been reduced.
This yields an interesting, though unsurprising, policy conclusion.  If countries that
are in competition for inward MNE investment are constrained from offering inducements in
the form of subsidies, then the conditions of employment will become more important in
determining which country will capture the firm.  The easier it is for a firm to shut down
operations in terms of costs of layoffs, the more appealing that location will be to the MNE.
The host country could impose higher redundancy payments and still make investing
attractive by offering a higher subsidy.  This can also be seen in Figure 3, at point C, where a
combination of r = 6⋅9 and 38S ≈ lies on R = 10.  However, the benefits to the host country
have diminished to the point where it is indifferent to the establishment of the branch plant
(i.e., B = 0).  We have already seen in Figure 1 that, for any given redundancy scheme, the
benefits to the MNE of investment will diminish, the higher the probability of closure.  Thus,
in a more uncertain investment climate, the host that requires least of the firm in terms of
redundancy payments will be best placed to attract the investment.
5. INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND MNE INVESTMENT
We have already established that a more uncertain investment climate (that is, a higher
probability of failure ρ ) makes the subsidies offered by the host government less attractive,
lowers the level of production of firms that do invest, and these effects together lower the
likelihood of a firm choosing to establish a branch plant.  In this section, we suggest that
16
some industries may be “higher risk” than others and consider whether the investment
climate within a country might be more conducive to one type of industry than another.
We have shown that a country with low redundancy payments is better able to attract
MNE investment than a country with high severance rates.  Thus, in Figure 2, the B = 0 and
R = 10 iso-benefit contours intersect at point A, where 30S ≈ and 3 7r ≈ ⋅ .  Were the
redundancy payments less, the host would not be prepared to offer as large a subsidy.  But the
MNE would not need as great a subsidy if layoffs were made less expensive.  Given the
relative slopes of the iso-benefit schedules, a reduction in r would reduce the subsidy
necessary to induce the investment by more than the fall in the government’s willingness to
pay.  Consequently, a country with low exit costs (in terms of its redundancy payments) is
able to offer better investment incentives, whatever the riskiness of the enterprise.  The “easy
come, easy go” host is therefore more attractive to all potential investors.
We now consider the impact of increasing uncertainty on both MNE and host
government.  Let the initial level of risk be ρ  and let the mandated level of redundancy
payments be r.  We can rewrite (13) in terms of SR, the subsidy level necessary for the firm to
achieve return R on its investment in the branch plant:
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
41 1
1 1 4 1 1R
a w r bFRS
b
β δρδσ ρ
δσ ρ δ ρ
 
− + − 
− −   
= − 
− − − −    
(17)
We can also rewrite (15) in terms of SB, the subsidy that the host country would be prepared
to offer while receiving a benefit level B from the investment:
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 12 1 1B
w r a w r BS
b
β δρ β δρδσ ρ
δσ ρδ ρ
 + − + 
− −   
= − 
− −− −    
(18)
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If the industry risk were to rise, while the redundancy rules remained the same, then
the subsidy necessary to keep the firm happy to invest would increase and government’s
willingness to pay would decline.  We define B RX S S≡ −  to be the excess subsidy, that is,
the difference between the subsidy that maintains the government’s benefits from the
investment in the branch plant and the subsidy that is now necessary to yield the same
expected returns to the MNE.  Subtracting (18) from (17) yields:
( ) ( )
( )
22 21 1 4
1 14 1 1
a w r bF B RX
b
δσ ρ β δρ
δσ ρδ ρ
 
− − − + − + 
= − 
− −− −    
(19)
Differentiating (19) shows that a country with lower redundancy payments is better able to
afford the subsidies to attract the MNE:
( ) ( )
( )
21 1
0
1 2 1 1
w rX
r b
δσ ρ β δρ δρ
δσ δ ρ
 
− − +∂  
= − < ∂ − − −    
which is a direct consequence of the slope of the iso-benefit schedule for the firm being
steeper than that of the host country.
It is evident from Figure 4 that, for any level of severance payments, increasing risk
reduces X.  That is, a riskier venture will require greater subsidies.  Consequently, the country
with less burdensome labour legislation will be able to attract firms from high-risk industries
that a country with high redundancy payments could not.  Compare, for example, two
countries where one has strong labour legislation mandating high redundancy payments (i.e.,
0r  ) and the other imposes no such obligations on the exiting firm (i.e., 0r = ).  From
Figure 4, it is clear that for a range of industry-specific risk, the investment would be
worthwhile if redundancy payments are low (as 0X ≥ ) while high rates of r would deter
entry of the MNE (because X < 0).
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we focus on location decisions for an MNE with several possible locations for a
plant to serve an integrated regional market.  Applying a very simple model, we illustrate
how various country and industry characteristics may affect the firm’s entry decision as well
as the activity level and profits should the firm decide to locate in a specific host country.
Previous studies [e.g., Fumagalli (1998), Haaland and Wooton (1999), Haufler and Wooton
(1999), and Markusen and Venables (1999)] have focussed on potential gains for the host
country should the MNE choose to establish production in the country, and on policy
competition between various potential host countries.  Although these models consider
policies to attract foreign direct investments, they do so in static and deterministic
frameworks using very simple policy measures.  We study various policy instruments in a
dynamic setting, where there is an industry-specific risk of failure.  To make the model as
simple as possible, we do not include externalities or spillovers that would create potential
benefits for the host country.  In principle there is no reason why such effects could not be
included in our model.  In this final section we will try to summarise and draw some policy
conclusions from our analysis.
The policy instruments we study are of two types: required redundancy payments; and
initial subsidies to the MNE.  The former may have to do with labour market flexibility in
general in the country; the latter is directly aimed at attracting foreign direct investments.
However, our analysis shows that both are important for the MNE’s entry decision, and that
there is a clear trade-off between labour-market inflexibility and the need for investment
subsidies.  Our analysis shows that redundancy payments not only affect a foreign firm’s
entry decision; should the firm choose to locate in the country, the activity and employment
levels and the operating profit will also be negatively affected by strict redundancy rules.
The more uncertain the future of the industry, the more severe will be the effects of such
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labour market rigidities.  Hence, although the redundancy rules are there as safeguards for the
workers, their consequence may well be less investment and lower employment levels during
operation.
Investment support may be important to attract foreign firms, but it will not affect the
operations once a plant is established.  Depending on the support policies and possible
repayment schemes, the subsidy elements of such policies have been analysed.  One
conclusion is that the more uncertain the industry is, the lower will the subsidy element be, as
long as there is some repayment requirement should the plant close down.
In evaluating possible policy mixes, a number of interesting conclusions appear.
Firstly, high redundancy payments work in the same way as high wage rates, discouraging
investments and employment.  Secondly, it would be optimal to have negative redundancy
payments, to ensure high activity levels while in operation and reduce the need for direct
subsidies.  Given non-negative redundancy payments, the more uncertain the industry is, the
higher is the cost, in terms of required investment subsidies, for the host country of a given
redundancy scheme.
These conclusions indicate that there may be systematic effects from the chosen
policy mix to the type of industries one may attract.  The more important uncertainties about
the future are, the more severe will be the effects of labour market inflexibility.  A natural
question is then the type of industry a country would like to attract.  Everything else equal,
one would expect that lower uncertainty would be preferred, such that the expected lifetime
of an investment is longer.  However, everything else is not necessarily equal.  Much depends
on the type of markets and the type of uncertainty we are looking at.  In many cases risky
projects are also more profitable should they succeed.  A new industry could, for example, be
such that there is a high risk of failure at the outset, but success would bring more
profitability (due to higher demand) than traditional industries.
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Hence, the choices we are discussing could also be between policies to attract new
and modern industries versus traditional industries, with which have lower profitability but
also lower risk of failure.  In such a setting, what we show is that labour-market flexibility is
important to attract the modern firms.  Such flexibility may, to some extent, offset high wages
and may also reduce the subsidy required to attract the firms.
We have so far only touched on policy competition in this setting.  There is, however,
good reason to believe that countries will compete for the most attractive investments.  As we
have shown, in this competition both the labour-market institutions and the direct subsidy
schemes will be important, with the industry uncertainty playing an important role.  The
outcome of the policy competition is the same across all industries, in that the “Easy Come,
Easy Go” host is more attractive to all potential investors.  Of particular interest is that the
country with lower severance rates can attract the riskier investments that other countries
deter through their labour laws.  We investigate this further in Haaland and Wooton (2000).
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Figure 1.  Level of redundancy payments and the benefits to the MNE of entry
Figure 2.  Iso-benefit loci for the host country and the MNE
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-15
-10
-5
5
10
ρ = 0.1
ρ = 0.15
ρ = 0.2
r
R
0
r
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
S
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
B = 0
R = 10
A
24
Figure 3.  Benefits to host country of various investment-incentive schemes
Figure 4.  Relationship between risk of closure and the excess subsidy
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